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THE EMOTIONAL ATIRIBUTES QUESTIONNAIRE: 
SELF-AND OTHER-REPORTS OF GUILT AND SHAME 
Shame and guilt are considered to be important emotions for empirical study 
for a variety of reasons. Developmental psychologists are interested in the 
emergence of shame and guilt as they relate to the child's understanding of societal 
and familial expectations/ norms and the subsequent development of conscience 
(Zahn-Wru<ler & Kochanska, 1990). Social psychologists study how guilt and shame 
are used to create power differentials and restore equity to relationships 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Finally, clinicians have long thought 
shame and guilt to be involved in the development of disorders such as anxiety and 
depression (H.B. Lewis, 1971). However, those within the clinical realm have often 
used the words "shame" and "guilt" interchangeably, and even the DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) fails to draw a clear distinction between the 
two. Because of the lack of conceptual clarity, there is is also confusion regarding 
whether shame and guilt are distinct precursors to different disorders. 
Many psychologists have discussed possible differences between shame and 
guilt. Shame is defined as an emotion that conveys that there is something 
fundamentally defective about the person. This often motivates the person who is 
experiencing shame to attempt to physically withdraw from · the shaming situation 
(e.g., by leaving the room) or, if escape is not feasible, to cognitively withdraw into 
the self (e.g., cessation of speech, averting gaze downward, slumping and hunching 
of shoulders, cf. Barrett, Zahn Waxler & Cole, 1993; M. Lewis, 1992). 
Guilt, on the other hand, conveys that one has been involved in an untoward 
action (whether by omission or commission), usually involving physical or 
psychological harm to another. The focus is on the action, and thus typically 
motivates individuals to confess, apologize, and/ or attempt to repair the damage 
that they have caused. The transgressor' s guilt is then typically dissipated, either 
because the other forgives them or dismisses the harmful deed (Baumeister et al., 
1994; Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991; Tangney, 1995a,b). 
Much effort has been put into developing valid measures of shame and guilt 
because these emotions are thought to be so important in normal and pathological 
functioning. Of the many measures that have been developed, three have been 
identified as the most promising in terms of construct validity (Tangney, 1996). 
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The first is Harder and Zalma's (1990) Personal Feelings Questionnaire, 
version 2 (PFQ-2). This measure is a global adjective checklist that asks respondents 
to rate the frequency with which they feel 16 different feeling states on a continuous 
basis. Of the 16 states, Harder hypothesizes that blushing, feeling embarrassed, 
ridiculous, self-conscious, humiliated, stupid, childish, helpless, laughable, and 
disgusting to others represent shame, whereas guilt is represented by mild guilt, 
worry about hurting or injuring someone, intense guilt, regret, remorse, and feeling 
you deserve criticism for what you did. According to Harder (1995), the higher the 
rating on this instrument, the more likely the person is to experience a chronic or 
pervasive form of guilt and/ or shame. The shame scale's internal consistency 
reliability (using Cronbach's alpha) was .78, and the guilt scale's was .72. 
The second instrument, the Test of Self-Conscious Affect-Modified (TOSCA-
M; Ferguson & Crowley, 1993) and its predecessor the Test of Self-Conscious Affect 
(Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989) is a scenario-based measure which asks 
participants to imagine that they are in 15 situations, and then rate the extent to 
which they would respond in different ways (coded, among other responses, for 
guilt and shame). 
For example: 
You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o'clock, you realize 
you stood him up. 
1) You cannot apologize enough for forgetting the appointment. 
(ruminative guilt) 
2) You would think: ''I'm inconsiderate." (shame) 
3) You would think: "Well, he'll understand." (detachment) 
4) You would try to make it up to him as soon as possible. (non-
ruminative guilt) 
5) You would think: "My boss distracted me just before lunch." 
( externalization) 
The TOSCA-M is a unique measure, in that it includes a scale to assess both 
ruminative guilt and nonruminative guilt. According to Ferguson and Crowley 
(1993; in press), ruminative guilt is a more lingering, pervasive form of guilt (see 
also Ferguson & Crowley, in press). Ruminative guilt can best be characterized by 
one of the DSM-IV's criteria for major depression, "feelings of worthlessness or 
excessive or inappropriate guilt...nearly every day" (p. 327). Nonruminative guilt, 
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in contrast, reflects guilt that is " ... designed to enforce the communal norms of 
mutual concern and nurturance and to protect the interpersonal bond between 
people." (Baumeister, et al., 1994, p. 246). The internal consistency reliabilities (using 
Cronbach's alpha) for the TOSCA-Mare .78, .77, .75, for shame, nonruminative guilt, 
and ruminative guilt, respectively. 
Finally, the Guilt Inventory (GI; Kugler & Jones, 1992) is a rating scale 
consisting of 45 items designed to assess morality (e.g., "I believe in a strict 
interpretation of right and wrong."), state guilt (e.g., "Lately, it hasn't been easy being 
me."), and trait guilt (e.g., "Guilt and remorse have been a part of my life for as long 
as I can recall."). As with the ruminative guilt scale of the TOSCA-M, the trait guilt 
scale of the GI is designed to assess a more lingering or prolonged form of guilt. 
Internal consistency reliabilities for the state and trait guilt scales are high, with 
Cronbach's alphas of .84 and .89, respectively. 
Unfortunately, research using these different measures finds discrepant results. 
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One possible reason for these disparate findings concerns the method variance 
associated with the different measures. Guilt and shame have been operationalized 
very differently across the various measures, with some researchers using specific 
situations about which the person can feel shame or guilt and others using more 
general ratings of adjectives. A second limitation with these measures is that all of 
them are self-report in nature. In the assessment literature more generally, there 
have been many issues raised about the validity of self-reports, such as self-
presentation response sets and the question of whether the respondent truly has 
access to the information being requested. Other factors also may influence a 
person's response, including whether the item is simply the socially desirable way to 
respond, and whether people can recollect events or general feelings. The type of 
scale that the person is asked to use when rating an event also affects their responses 
(Brehm & Kassin, 1996). All of these more general criticisms of self-report measures 
also specifically apply to the assessment of shame and guilt. 
There are two more major problems with using self-reports in the area of shame 
and guilt assessment. The first is the tendency of individuals to minimize these 
painful emotions to the point where, either consciously or unconsciously, they 
under-report their frequency and intensity. A second is that a self-report requires 
the respondent to report on rapidly changing emotional states to which the person 
probably has little conscious access and which he or she would be likely to distort 
(either intentionally or unintentionally, cf. Ferguson & Stegge, in press) . Some 
researchers believe that for this reason, it is impossible for an individual to 
accurately report his or her own internal state (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
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So, it is clear that we should not be relying exclusively on self-reports to 
measure guilt and shame. The next question is, what other alternatives to self-
report measurement are available? We could try to measure the emotions using 
observations of behavior by trained experimenters and/ or outsiders who know the 
individual well. Trained experimenters have made behavioral observations of 
shame and guilt in toddlers (Barrett et al., 1993; Lewis, Alessandri, & Sullivan, 1992; 
Lewis, Stanger, Sullivan, & Barone, 1991), but to date, few have examined whether 
outside observers (such as friends) can reliably report on another's shame- and guilt-
related behaviors (for exceptions, see Ferguson & Stegge, in press; Jones & Kugler, 
1993). Nonetheless, we know from research in other contexts (e.g., personality traits, 
Hayes & Dunning, 1997; emotional traits, Watson & Clark, 1991; childhood behavior 
problems, Achenbach, McConaughy, & Howell, 1987) that outside observers can 
provide a unique perspective on the target person's behavior. Using other-reports 
seems to be a reasonable strategy, because they could give the researcher a broader 
picture of the target person's typical behavior in different situations. Also, the · 
person who is doing the observations might not be as concerned about self-
presentational issues as would be the target person. This could increase the external 
validity of reports and hopefully reduce bias. 
Therefore, the purpose of the present honors thesis was three-fold: (1) to 
develop an "other-report" measure of guilt and shame, (2) to examine the 
relationship between the new other-report measures and existing self-report 
measures, and (3) to determine the predictive validity of the other-report 
instruments in terms of depression and anxiety (as assessed by subscales of the 
Symptom Checklist-90-R; Derogatis, 1983), and internalizing symptoms, 
externalizing symptoms, and adaptive functioning (as assessed by subscales of the 
:Ml\1PI-2; Butcher, 1990). 
Method 
Participants were 102 (34 male and 68 female) introductory psychology 
students who received extra course credit. Students were predominantly middle-
class Caucasians, whose mean age was 20.2 years (range 18-38 years). Of these 
participants, 26 males and 57 females had either his or her spouse or best friend 
complete a packet of other-report questionnaires. Participants were asked to use the 
following criteria when selecting the person to complete the other-report packet: 
"choose someone whom you have known for more than a year, knows you very 
well, and spends a good deal of time with you in a variety of situations." 
Other-Report Instruments 
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The packet completed by participants consisted of several exploratory other-
report instruments (which were not analyzed for this thesis) and a new other-report 
instrument entitled the Emotional Attributes Questionnaire-Other (EAQ-O; Eyre & 
Ferguson, 1996) which was designed for this study. The EAQ-O is an adult version 
of the My Child-Guilt and My Child-Shame parent-report measures (Ferguson, 
Stegge, & Barrett, 1996). It contains 45 items designed to assess both the ruminative 
and nonruminative aspects of guilt and 60 items to assess shame. The items are 
rated on a 7-point Likert scale (l=not at all true to Z=extremely true) and includes a 
"not applicable" choice. These items were taken from several theoretical scales 
thought to represent different aspects of the process of feeling guilty or ashamed. 
The nonruminative guilt scale was composed of items representing six different 
subscales. These subscales included nonruminative guilt behaviors (e.g., "Appears 
anxious or agitated after having done something wrong."), concern over good 
feelings after wrongdoing (e.g., "Whens/he does something wrong, seems to feel 
relieved when forgiven."), confession (e.g., "May confess to a misdeed even if 
unlikely to be caught."), apology and/ or promise not to do it anymore (e.g., "Will 
apologize after causing an accident or doing something else wrong."), 
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reparation/ amends (e.g., "Is eager to make up after having hurt someone's feelings 
or breaking a promise."), and empathy (e.g., "Will feel sorry for other people who 
are hurt, sick, or unhappy."). The ruminative guilt scale consists of items that relate 
to lingering or pervasive feelings of guilt ( e.g., "Seems to remember for a long time 
past instances whens/he did something wrong.") The shame scale consists of seven 
subscales that assess shame behaviors (e.g., "After failure, looks likes/he could 
crawl into a hole and die."), concern over good feelings after wrongdoing or failure 
(e.g., "Whens/he fails on a task, seems to need a lot of reassurance thats/he's till a 
good person."), denial of feeling (e.g., "Has a hard time admitting to failure or falling 
short."), excusing or rationalizing (e.g., "S/he blames own failure on others or 
difficulty of the task."), avoidance (e.g., "Can't seem to look you in the eye after 
getting caught doing something wrong."), internalized conduct (e.g., "Has a 
perfectionistic attitude."), and narcissism or self-focus (e.g., "Bends over backwards 
to be liked by others."). 
Self-Report Instruments 
All participants completed the original self-report versions of the TOSCA-M, 
PFQ-2, GI, plus an abbreviated version of the MMPI-2. For comparison with the 
EAQ-O, a self-report version of this instrument entitled the Emotional Attributes 
Questionnaire-Self (EAQ-S) was also developed. This instrument consists of the 
same nonruminative guilt, ruminative guilt, and shame scales as the other-report 
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version, but the items were presented in first-person. 
To assess (mal)adjustment, participants completed two different types of 
instruments. The MNIPI-2 was included as a less transparent, and therefore less 
reactive, instrument of symptoms of psychopathology and adjustment. The SCL-90-
R is thought to be a more transparent measure of general distress. By contrasting 
these two instruments, we hoped to discover whether guilt and shame interacted 
differentially with a more versus less transparent measure of (mal)adjustment. 
An abbreviated version of the MNIPI-2 (Butcher, 1990) was used, consisting of 
201 true/ false statements which made up 12 scales. The first scale, ego strength (52 
items), was included to assess whether nonruminative guilt is really tapping into 
adjustment. A person rating high on ego strength is likely to be stable, reliable, 
responsible, independent, self-confident, sociable, have a secure sense of reality and 
show no chronic psychopathology (Graham, 1993). The remaining 11 scales were 
factor analyzed and two factors, accounting for 68.1 % of the variance, emerged, 
yielding eigenvalues greater than one. Scales that had high loadings on the factor 
"internalizing" were psychasthenia or obsessive-compulsive tendencies (48 items), 
anxiety (39 items), obvious depression (39 items), brooding (10 items), low self-
esteem (24 items), shyness/ self-consciousness (14 items), and lack of ego mastery (14 
items). Scale·s loading high on "externalizing" were anger (16 items), lack of ego 
inhibition (11 items), amorality (6 items), and a negative loading on subtle 
depression (18 items). 
The Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1983) was included to look 
at the relationship between shame and guilt and a fairly transparent measure of 
internalizing symptoms. Although the SCL-90-R consists of more scales, we only 
looked at the four scales that approximated the internalizing factor on the MNIPI-2. 
These four scales are thought to clearly represent anxiety ( e.g., spells of terror or 
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panic), depression (e.g., feelings of worthlessness), obsessions or compulsions (e.g., 
having to check and double-check what you do), and phobic anxiety (e.g., having to 
avoid certain things, places, or activities because they frighten you). 
Results 
Psychometric properties of the EAQ-O and EAQ-S 
Item-total correlations were calculated for each item on the shame, 
nonruminative guilt, and ruminative guilt scales of the EAQ-O and EAQ-S. The 
nonruminative guilt and ruminative guilt scales yielded no items with very low 
item-total correlations. For the shame scale, however, every item on the 
internalized conduct subscale showed zero or near-zero correlations with the 
overall shame scale. Since it showed such low correlations, this subscale was 
dropped from the overall shame scale of both the EAQ-O and EAQ-S. 
For this revised version, internal consistency reliabilities were high for both 
the EAQ-O scales (Cronbach's alphas of .91 for nonruminative guilt, .86 for 
ruminative guilt, and .92 for shame) and EAQ-S scales (alphas of .85 for 
nonruminative guilt, .88 for ruminative guilt, and .94 for shame). 
The correlations between the same scales on the self- and other-report were 
very high (.74 for nonruminative guilt; .56 for ruminative guilt; .54 for shame, I!< 
.001). However, it should be noted that the correlations across scales for the self- and 
other-reports were moderate to high, with a range of .24 (between EAQ-O shame and 
EAQ-S nonruminative guilt) to .53 (between EAQ-O nonruminative guilt and EAQ-
S ruminative guilt). This could possibly be due to method variance (cf. Ferguson & 
Crowley, in press) or a tendency to respond with general negative emotion (cf. 
Watson & Clark, 1992). 
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Table 1 depicts the correlations between the guilt and shame scales of the self-
and other-reports. For both the self- and other-reports, the ruminative guilt and 
shame scales correlate the highest, while shame and nonruminative guilt, as 
predicted, have the lowest correlations. It is interesting to note that the ruminative 
guilt and shame correlation is higher than the ruminative guilt and nonruminative 
guilt correlations. The ruminative guilt and nonruminative guilt scales yielded the 
most discrepant correlations between the self- and other-reports (.51 for the EAQ-S 
and .36 for the EAQ-O). 
Rather than relying solely on univariate techniques, canonical correlation 
analysis was also used to analyze the data. The following rationale for using 
canonical correlation analysis and explanation of the technique is essentially 
borrowed from the text of Ferguson and Crowley (in press). 
To analyze variables that are highly interrelated, such as ruminative guilt, 
nonruminative guilt, and shame, statisticians recommend using canonical 
correlational analyses (Pedhazur, 1982; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996; Thompson, 1984). 
Canonical correlations are unique in that, unlike multiple regression, they can 
analyze two sets of interrelated variables while accommodating the intercorrelation 
between those variables. Univariate analyses (i.e., bivariate correlations, partial 
correlations, and regression analyses) can only consider a single variable at a time 
and therefore may distort the multivariate relationships existing in the data. 
There are two components to a canonical correlation. The first is a function 
coefficient which is essentially a beta weight. In order to determine if a function is 
meaningful, common practice dictates that it be significant at the J2 < .05 level and 
account for at least 10% of the variance. The second component is a structure 
coefficient, which represents the correlation between the variable(s) of interest (e.g., 
EAQ-S shame) and the canonical variate. This coefficient is used for interpretation 
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purposes, and may be considered in the same manner as a bivariate correlation 
coefficient, using 10% of the explained variance (approximately r ~ .30) as a guide for 
identifying meaningful correlations. For the first set of analyses, the extant self-
report measures are predictor variables, while the EAQ-S and EAQ-O are criterion 
variables. However, for the second set of analyses, all of the guilt and shame 
instruments serve as predictor variables and the (mal)adjustment scales as the 
criterion. 
For the EAQ-S in conjunction with the other guilt and shame self-report 
instruments, canonical correlational analysis revealed that there were two 
significant functions that accounted for more than 10% of the variance. As seen in 
Table 2, the first function, accounting for 70.6% of the variance, shows that both the 
predictor variables and criterion variables are all highly related. The second 
function, which accounted for an additional 43.8% of the variance, indicates that 
nonruminative guilt as measured by the TOSCA-Mand EAQ-S are both correlated 
in the same direction, which is opposite of all other variables. Ruminative guilt (in 
both the TOSCA-Mand EAQ-S) are not related to the other scales. It is interesting to 
note that the GI scales have a strong relationship, while the the PFQ-2 guilt scale 
only has a moderate relationship. It is also interesting that the PFQ-2 shame scale 
has a much stronger relationship than does the TOSCA-M shame scale. This second 
function is important, since it indicates that a m·eaningful distinction does exist 
between ruminative guilt and shame, an issue that has been a contentious one in 
this measurement area (Denham, 1996). 
The analysis between the EAQ-0 and the TOSCA-M, PFQ-2, and GI also revealed 
two significant functions that accounted for more than 10% of the variance. The 
first function, accounting for 62.2% of the variance, behaves in a similar fashion to 
the first function of the EAQ-S, as illustrated in Table 3. The second function 
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(accounting for 43.9% of the remaining variance), however, does show some slightly 
different patterns . Again, nonruminative guilt (in the EAQ-O and TOSCA-M) 
seems to go in the opposite direction of all other scales. The TOSCA-M shame and 
ruminative guilt scales have no relationship with the canonical variable, but in this 
case both the ruminative guilt and shame scales from the EAQ-O do have a fairly 
strong relationship. Both the PFQ-2 and GI have moderately strong correlations. In 
general, the bivariate correlations support the canonicals for both the self- and 
other-reports of the EAQ. 
Predictive validity of the EAQ and other guilt and shame instruments 
This final section is devoted to the analysis of the ability of the EAQ TOSCA-
M, PFQ-2, and GI to predict symptoms of psychopathology, specifically symptoms 
related to internalizing and externalizing disorders as measured by the MMPI-2 and 
internalizing symptoms as measured by the SCL-90-R. Also, we looked at ego 
strength as an index of adjustment, in relation to guilt and shame. 
At the bivariate level, many of the results found using the MMPI-2 replicate 
and extend previous findings. The scenario-based measure of nonruminative guilt 
is unrelated to this less transparent assessment of (mal)adjustment, whereas 
instruments assessing more general guilt reactions (the PFQ-2 and GI) are related 
positively to internalization and (to a far lesser extent) negatively to ego strength. 
Self- and other-reports of nonruminative guilt-related behaviors also are unrelated 
to indices of (mal)adjustment. 
The scenario-based assessment of shame and ruminative guilt are related 
positively to less transparent measures of internalization (especially) and 
externalization, but negatively to ego strength. The PFQ-2 shame measure, 
although unrelated to externalization, is related as would be expected to both 
internalization and ego strength. Self- and other-reports of shame and ruminative 
guilt-related behaviors also related especially to the internalization measure of 
maladjustment. 
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To further analyze the multivariate relationship between scenario-type 
reports, adjective checklist reports, and other-reports in predicting psychopathology, 
canonical correlations were performed. The analyses were broken down by scale 
type (guilt scales versus shame scales) in looking at both maladjustment and 
adjustment. For the first canonical analysis, because there were no differences 
between the self- and other-reports of EAQ shame scales in relation to the SCL-90-R, 
they were put in the equation together, reanalyzed, and are reported together in 
Table 5. 
One significant function which accounted for 44.8% of the variance emerged 
in this analysis. Table 5 indicates that all four indices of shame relate to the SCL-90-
R, with the relationship between shame and depression being the strongest. 
There were two significant functions that accounted for the relationship 
between the TOSCA-M, PFQ-2, and EAQ-S shame scales, which are depicted in Table 
6. The first function (accounting for 42.9% of the variance) shows that the TOSCA-
M, PFQ-2, and to a lesser extent, the EAQ-S shame scales are related to primarily 
internalizing disorders. The relationship with externalizing is smaller than with 
internalizing, but there is a strong inverse relationship between ego strength and 
shame. However, the second function (accounting for 14.1% of the remaining 
variance) depicts a completely different type of relationship. This function shows 
no relationship between the TOSCA-Mand PFQ-2 and (mal)adjustment. However, 
there is a positive relationship between the EAQ-S shame scale and internalizing, 
externalizing, and ego strength (not inversely). 
The analysis between the TOSCA-M, PFQ-2, EAQ-O and (mal)adjustment 
failed to reveal the second function that was present with the EAQ-S. The first 
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function, however, is very similar to the first function of the previous analysis. All 
three shame scales are related to internalizing, to a lesser degree externalizing, and 
negatively to ego strength. 
For the following analyses of guilt in relation to (mal)adjustment, only the 
trait guilt scale of the GI was used because we were interested in the relationship 
between pervasive traits and (mal)adjustment, rather than momentary states. Also, 
the self- and other-report versions of the EAQ are analyzed separately due to the 
small number of participants compared to variables being analyzed. 
When comparing both ruminative and nonruminative guilt to the SCL-90-R, 
some interesting results emerge (this function accounted for 56.7% of the variance). 
As illustrated in Table 7, the ruminative guilt indices (TOSCA-M ruminative guilt, 
PFQ-2 guilt, GI trait guilt, and EAQ-S ruminative guilt) were all related to symptoms 
of psychopathology. Even though lower, it is interesting that the nonruminative 
guilt scales are also similarly related to SCL-90-R symptom scores. 
As evident in Table 8, the same trend emerges for the analysis involving the 
EAQ other-reports, as does with the self-reports. Again, both ruminative and 
nonruminative guilt (only marginally with the EAQ-O nonruminative guilt scale) 
relates to the SCL-90-R scales. 
The pattern of correlations found for the ruminative guilt scale in relation to 
the MMPI-2 is similar to that found for the SCL-90-R. This function accounted for 
59.7% of the variance. As shown in Table 9, ruminative guilt relates to 
internalizing, to a lesser degree, externalizing, and inversely to ego strength. 
However, a very different pattern emerges when comparing the nonruminative 
guilt scales to the :rvnvIPI-2 - they do not relate at all to internalizing, externalizing, 
or ego strength. In fact, the near zero structure coefficient combined with the 
nonzero function coefficient for nonruminative guilt on the EAQ-S indicates that 
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this variable acts as a suppressor effect relative to the remaining emotion variables. 
By removing the high covariance among the emotion variables (part of which 
simply reflects the focus of all scales on negative emotions and behaviors), 
nonruminative guilt acts to increase the relations between the MMPI-2 scales and 
the remaining emotion variables. 
The comparison between the TOSCA-M guilt scales, PFQ-2 guilt, GI trait guilt, 
and the EAQ-0 guilt scales reveals virtually the same results as does the comparison 
involving the self-report version (as seen in Table 10). 
When looking at the overall trends in the canonical correlations, there seems 
to be an predominant factor of general negative emotion. This general negative 
emotion then predicts to internalizing, to some extent externalizing disorders, and 
negatively to ego strength. 
In conclusion, the two different indices of (mal)adjustment used in this study 
(MMPI-2 versus SCL-90-R) showed differential relationships to the various 
measures of guilt and shame. Both in the bivariate and multivariate analyses, we 
essentially find that symptom indices from the SCL-90-R are consistently related to 
shame, nonruminative guilt, and ruminative guilt (although less so for the 
behaviorally-based measure of nonruminative guilt when compared to the other 
guilt measures). 
When we combine the various indices of guilt into one multivariate analysis, 
we find essentially that the best predictors of (mal)adjustment on the less 
transparent measure again are those that assess more general guilt reactions ( the 
PFQ-2 and GI) or more ruminative forms of the emotion. Shame in these 
multivariate analyses also is related as would be expected to these indices of 
maladjustment (although the loadings are lower for a behaviorally-based measure 
than ones assessing general shame reactions or shame responses to concrete 
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situations). The behaviorally-based self-report measure of shame reactions showed, 
in fact, a curious positive relationship not only to internalizing and externalizing, 
but also to ego strength. 
Summary and Discussion 
Using a less reactive measure of symptoms (the :MMPI-2), we replicated 
earlier findings that nonruminative guilt, measured using a scenario-type 
procedure, is a weaker predictor of problems or adjustment compared to reports of 
more chronic manifestations of the emotion. Our confidence that nonruminative 
guilt truly is unrelated to psychopathology is strengthened by the even lower links 
found between behaviorally-oriented self-assessments of the nonruminative guilt 
construct and indicators of {mal)adjustment. We interpret the findings involving a 
more reactive measure of symptoms (the SCL-90-R) to mean that the various 
measures of self-conscious emotion assess a distress or negativity component in 
people's reactions . This conclusion is least warranted, however, for the more 
behaviorally -based assessment of nonruminative guilt responses. When we 
combine the findings for univariate and multivariate relationships of 
nonruminative guilt responses to both the MMPI-2 and the SCL-90-R, one 
conclusion seems reasonable: A behaviorally-based assessment of nonruminative 
guilt is the best reflection that we have to date of how the tendency to experience 
remorse or regret does not contribute to psychological functioning once we take into 
account emotion-nonspecific variance accounted for by negative valence or hedonic 
tone (Watson & Clark, 1992). 
The results for shame also replicate and extend previous findings. It is clear 
from the bivariate and multivariate results using a more reactive measure of 
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symptoms that all of the shame measures contain a large distress or negative 
valence component. Results for the MMPI-2 also generally show that the three 
measures of shame are related positively to symptoms but negatively to ego 
strength. However, there are some intriguing differences at the bivariate level in 
how the three shame measures are related to the less reactive indices of 
(mal)adjustment. At the bivariate level, all three measures are positively related to 
internalization, but the additional positive association between shame and 
externalization is found for the behavioral assessments and TOSCA-M measure of 
shame and not for the PFQ-2 index. Also at the bivariate level, the TOSCA-Mand 
PFQ-2 measures of shame are negatively related to ego strength, whereas the same 
relationships for behavioral assessments are negligible. These individual 
relationships combine to account neatly for the pattern of relationships reflected in 
the first canonical function at the multivariate level (see Tables 5 and 6). 
Why would there be a positive association between shame and 
externalization for the behaviorally-based and scenario-based assessments but not 
for an adjective checklist measure? An easy answer is available for the behavioral 
indices, since this measure explicitly incorporated externalization-type shame 
responses (e.g., "S/he blames own failure on others or difficulty of the task." or 
"Tries to justify or rationalize bad performance."). In terms of the TOSCA-M, the 
strong shame-externalization link replicates previous findings (H.B. Lewis, 1971; M. 
Lewis, 1992; Retzinger, 1995; Scheff, 1995; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995) and -
given the immediate nature of the situations used - could reflect participants' 
strong intentions or desires to defend against shame via extrapunitive responses. 
However, the strong immediate links between shame and externalization might not 
become transferred into participants' longer-term representations of shameful 
feelings themselves, which could be what participants draw on when they make 
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global shame assessments (PFQ-2). This interpretation is admittedly speculative but 
is not inconsistent with clinicians' discussions of the defensive blocking involved in 
shame-externalization or shame-rage cycles (H.B. Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1995) 
Turning to the relation between ego strength and the shame measures, it is 
not surprising that global or intense and cross-situationally consistent self-
flagellation, which is what the shame responses represent in both the PFQ-2 and 
TOSCA-M, is negatively related to a measure of psychological resilience. Surprising 
at first glance is, however, the positive association between a behavioral assessment 
of shame and ego strength, once variance due to the general distress encompassed by 
shame is removed (see Table 6). There are several possible interpretations of this 
result - all of which are purely speculative and only two of which will be 
mentioned here. 
One possibility is that once one removes the variance due to general distress, 
the index of ego strength and the behavioral index of shame are each strongly 
tapping into the person's concern with interpersonal rejection or acceptance. The 
EAQ-S includes many interpersonally-oriented shame behaviors (which is the 
premise behind an other-report measure), with items such as, "After I have failed or 
done something wrong, I want reassurance that others don't view me as a 'failure'." 
The ego strength scale also incorporates this interpersonal orientation by including 
items that reflect having healthy relationships with others. Most shame items on 
the TOSCA-M have less to do with the person's socially-oriented reactions than 
with their desire simply to protect the self (through avoidance) or with the affect of 
shame itself. Similarly with the PFQ-2, the participant is simply rating the frequency 
with which they feel shame-related affect. The other possibility is that being able to 
admit to, or engage in, concrete and common shame behaviors (which is what 
participants are doing in the EAQ-S) indirectly assesses the person's 
nondefensiveness, which also is involved in ego strength. We obviously need to 
further explore links between ego strength and various subscales of the EAQ to 
adequately examine these ideas. 
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In conclusion: There are indications from our research that behavioral self-
report assessments of guilt and shame yield somewhat different links to symptoms 
and indices of well-being than the measures reported thus far in the literature. 
These differential relationships need to be studied further paying close attention to 
both the emotion and criterion measures used. Like Watson and Clark, we suspect 
that many of the emotion-symptom links reported in this area say more about the 
unspecific distress common to measures of emotion and symptoms than they 
provide unique information about specific emotion-symptom liaisons. In addition, 
the structure of all of these emotions needs to be unpacked more carefully (Russell, 
1997) - paying close attention to the possibly nested, yet overlapping, relationship 
of nonruminative guilt to both positive and negative affect and the tighter affinity 
between negative affect and shame or ruminative guilt. 
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Canonical Correlation Results for EAQ-Self: Function Coefficients, Structure 
Coefficients, and Percentage of Variance Accounted for by each Variable 
First Function Second Function 
Function rs rs2(%) Function rs rs2<%> 
EAO-Self Variate Set 
EAQ Shame -.24 -.66 43.6 .98 .74 54.8 
EAQ Rum. Guilt -.46 -.89 79.2 -.17 .19 3.6 
EAQ Nonrum. Guilt -.53 -.83 68.9 -.61 -.50 25.0 
Predictor Variate Set 
Tosca-M Shame -.06 -.79 62.4 -.03 .31 9.6 
Tosca-M Rum. Guilt -.27 -.87 75.7 .14 .13 1.6 
Tosca-M Nonrum. Guilt -.62 -.90 81.0 -.59 -.35 13.3 
PFQ-2 Shame .03 -.40 16.0 .65 .64 40.1 
PFQ-2 Guilt -.04 -.47 22.1 -.57 .34 11.6 
GI State Guilt .02 -.53 28.1 .69 .70 49.0 
GI Trait Guilt -.30 -.58 33.6 .12 .62 38.4 
Table 3 
Canonical Correlation Results for EAQ-Other: Function Coefficients, Structure 
Coefficients, and Percentage of Variance Accounted for by each Variable 
First Function Second Function 
Function rs rs2(%) Function rs rs2(%) 
EAO-Other Variate Set 
EAQ Shame .67 .80 64.0 -.52 -.59 34.8 
EAQ Rum. Guilt -.04 .70 49.0 -.39 -.45 20.2 
EAQ Nonrum. Guilt .63 .79 62.4 .88 .59 34.8 
Predictor Variate Set 
Tosca-M Shame -.32 .74 54.8 .62 -.11 1.2 
Tosca-M Rum. Guilt .60 .86 73.4 -.77 -.10 1.0 
Tosca-M Nonrum. Guilt .47 .81 65.6 .91 .45 20.2 
PFQ-2 Shame .23 .63 39.7 .02 -.43 18.5 
PFQ-2 Guilt .24 .66 43.6 -.48 -.49 24.0 
GI State Guilt -.17 .53 28.1 -.83 -.57 32.5 




Bivariate Correlations for the Shame and Guilt Scales with the Measures of 
(Mal)adjustment 
MMPI-2 MMPI-2 MMPI-2 SCL 
Internal External Ego Str Anx 
EAQ-S Shame .41** .20 -.01 .36** 
EAQ-S Rum. Guilt .43** .25* -.03 .39** 
EAQ-S Nonrum. Guilt .08 .08 .04 .09 
EAQ-O Shame .37** .21 -.07 .34** 
EAQ-O Rum. Guilt .37** .22* -.14 .35** 
EAQ-O Nonrum. Guilt .12 .07 .00 .21 
TOSCA-M Shame .55** .30** -.36** .53** 
TOSCA-M Rum. Guilt .47** .21* -.24* .41** 
TOSCA-M Nonrum. Guilt .08 .08 .08 .24* 
PFQ-2 Shame 
PFQ-2 Guilt 
GI Trait Guilt 
GI State Guilt 
* Q < .05 













































Canonical Correlation Results for TOSCA-M, PFQ-2, EAQ-Self, and EAQ-Other 
Shame Scales with the SCL-90-R: Function Coefficients, Structure Coefficients, and 
Percentage of Variance Accounted for by each Variable 
First Function 
Function !:s !:s2(%) 
Shame Variate Set 
TOSCA-M Shame -.51 -.88 77.4 
PFQ-2 Shame -.26 -.77 59.3 
EAQ-S Shame -.29 -.77 59.3 
EAQ-O Shame -.20 -.65 42.3 
SCL-90-R Variate Set 
Anxiety .21 -.79 62.4 
Depression -.67 -.94 88.4 
Obsessive-Compulsive -.32 -.84 70.6 
Phobic Anxiety -.36 -.73 53.3 
Table 6 
Canonical Correlation Results for TOSCA-M, PFQ-2, and EAQ-Self Shame Scales 
with the MMPI-2: Function Coefficients, Structure Coefficients, and Percentage of 
Variance Accounted for by each Variable 
First Function Second Function 
Function rs rs2(%) Function rs fs2(%) 
Shame Variate Set 
TOSCA-M Shame .52 .88 77.4 -.05 .10 1.0 
PFQ-2 Shame .56 .89 79.2 -.67 -.21 4.4 
EAQ-S Shame .08 .58 33.6 1.10 .78 60.8 
MMPI-2 Variate Set 
Internalizing .73 .89 79.2 1.27 .42 17.6 
Externalizing .02 .35 12.3 -.76 .45 20.3 




Canonical Correlation Results for TOSCA-M, PFQ-2, and EAQ-Self Guilt Scales with 
the SCL-90-R: Function Coefficients, Structure Coefficients, and Percentage of 
Variance Accounted for by each Variable 
First Function 
Function rs D,2(%) 
Guilt Variate Set 
TOSCA-M Rum. Guilt -.50 -.83 68.9 
TOSCA-M Nonrum. Guilt -.25 -.57 32.5 
PFQ-2 Guilt -.42 -.79 62.4 
GI Trait Guilt -.22 -.79 62.4 
EAQ-S Rum. Guilt -.04 -.68 46.2 
EAQ-S Nonrum. Guilt .25 -.35 12.3 
SCL-90-R Variate Set 
Anxiety .09 -.85 72.3 
Depression -.65 -.97 94.1 
Obsessive-Compulsive -.31 -.91 82.8 
Phobic Anxiety -.24 -.73 53.3 
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Table 8 
Canonical Correlation Results for TOSCA-M, PFQ-2, and EAQ-Other Guilt Scales 
with the SCL-90-R: Function Coefficients, Structure Coefficients, and Percentage of 
Variance Accounted for by each Variable 
First Function 
Function rs !:,s2(%) 
Guilt Variate Set 
TOSCA-M Rum. Guilt -.52 -.88 77.4 
TOSCA-M Nonrum. Guilt -.14 -.60 36.0 
PFQ-2 Guilt -.29 -.78 60.8 
GI Trait Guilt -.27 -.81 65.6 
EAQ-O Rum. Guilt -.09 -.67 44.9 
EAQ-O N onrum. Guilt .12 -.37 13.7 
SCL-90-R Variate Set 
Anxiety .30 -.82 67.2 
Depression -.62 -.95 90.3 
Obsessive-Compulsive -.49 -.93 86.5 
Phobic Anxiety -.29 -.71 50.4 
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Table 9 
Canonical Correlation Results for TOSCA-M, PFQ-2, and EAQ-Self Guilt Scales with 
the MMPI-2: Function Coefficients, Structure Coefficients, and Percentage of 
Variance Accounted for by each Variable 
First Function 
Function rs ts2(%) 
Guilt Variate Set 
TOSCA-M Rum. Guilt .70 .71 50.4 
TOSCA-M Nonrum. Guilt -.18 .24 5.8 
PFQ-2 Guilt .45 .79 62.4 
GI Trait Guilt .24 .77 59.3 
EAQ-S Rum. Guilt .07 .56 31.4 
EAQ-S Nonrum. Guilt -.35 .09 0.8 
MMPI-2 Variate Set 
Internalizing .96 .98 96.0 
Externalizing -.07 .53 28.1 
Ego Strength -.17 -.57 32.5 
Table 10 
Canonical Correlation Results for TOSCA-M, PFQ-2, and EAQ-Other Guilt Scales 
with the MMPI-2: Function Coefficients, Structure Coefficients, and Percentage of 
Variance Accounted for by each Variable 
Guilt Variate Set 
TOSCA-M Rum. Guilt 
TOSCA-M Nonrum. Guilt 
PFQ-2 Guilt 
GI Trait Guilt 
EAQ-O Rum. Guilt 
EAQ-O Nonrum. Guilt 





Function rs rs2<%) 
-.66 
.37 
-.32 
-.27 
-.24 
.09 
-.89 
.03 
.19 
-.74 
-.28 
-.80 
-.78 
-.71 
-.20 
-.99 
-.60 
.74 
54.8 
7.8 
64.0 
60.8 
50.4 
4.0 
98.0 
36.0 
54.8 
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